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The impact of market deregulation on milk price: A dynamic panel data approach  
 
 
Panagiotis Fotisa and Michael Polemisb,c*1 
Abstract  
The scope of this paper is to investigate the impact of market deregulation on the competitiveness 
of raw milk producers in Greece along the suggested lines of OECD (OECD, 2014). The study 
uses a dynamic panel data approach, to assess changes in the relative competitiveness of milk 
producers as a result of certain deregulation policies imposed by the Greek government in two 
phases (May 2014 and September 2015). In order to account for the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence and non-stationarity, the empirical analysis implements novel panel econometric 
methodology namely Common Correlated Effects (CCE) and Augmented Mean Group estimators 
(AMG). Our sample uses micro level data drawn from the 45 Greek regions spanning the period 
from January 2010 to October 2017. By comparing the wholesale prices of milk affected by 
regulation before and after the policy changes, we infer that abolishing regulation led to an increase 
in the prices of the wholesalers and thus in their profitability levels. Moreover, we argue that the 
openness of the relevant milk market segment had significant implications to the level of 
competition in the sector. Lastly, our empirical findings which confirm the OECD competition 
guidelines in the milk sector remain rather robust under different empirical methodologies and 
sample splitting, providing a focal point to policy makers and government officials for the ex-post 
evaluation of the deregulation strategies.  
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1. Introduction  
 Regulation is often regarded as a means of state interventionism in imperfect competitive 
markets to increase producer and consumer surplus and thus social welfare (Viscusi et al, 2005). 
Since the scope of regulation is set it is important to wonder how deregulation policies might 
actually affect the overall performance of an industry/sector and change inter aliathe level of 
wholesale prices (Genakos, et al, 2018). This study tries to investigate the relevant research 
question and attempt to fill the gap in the empirical literature regarding the post-evaluation of 
certain deregulatory measures implemented in an oligopolistic market such as milk industry. 
It is worth emphasizing that the ex-post evaluation literature on the impact of deregulation 
policies on prices and profits is rather limited. In an influential study Genakos et al, (2018) by 
using a Difference-in-Difference methodology investigate the effect of maximum wholesale and 
retail markup regulation in certain Greek oligopolistic sectors. They argue that deregulation led to 
significant price decreases, corresponding to an estimated €256 million yearly decrease in 
consumer expenditure. Their study provides indirect but consistent evidence that the most likely 
explanation for this outcome was collusion by the wholesalers. In a similar study, Hendel el al, 
(2017) examine the effect of a consumer boycott on cottage cheese in Israel started back in 2011. 
They claim that the boycott led to an immediate decline inprices, which remain low even six years 
later. Moreover, the empirical findings reveal that own and cross-price elasticities increased 
substantially after the boycott, while post-boycott prices were substantially below thelevels 
implied by the post-boycott demand elasticities. This study highlights the consumers’ unilateral 
effects such as activism and boycotts in order to mitigate the market power in a heavily regulated 
oligopolistic market.  
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 Regulatory barriers in specific food sectors, such as the dairy industry that hinder the level of 
effective competition, have been already identified by the national governments or world 
organizations and institutions (EU, OECD, IMF, etc). Obstacles are often created by the fact that 
the legislation frequently provides restrictive definitions of certain foodproducts or their 
components, or activities which do not take into consideration recent technological developments 
or the practice in other EU countries (OECD, 2014).To give an example, one might consider that 
legislation concerning the shelf life of milk protects local markets from internal and foreign 
competition to the detriment of consumer choice and welfare. 
 Along this point of skepticism, it is important to stress that the Greek pasteurized retail milk 
sector was characterized by a strict legislative regime concerning the shelf life of milk until 2015. 
This year the shelf price of pasteurized milk was fully deregulated, while prior to 2015 the Greek 
government partially deregulated the shelf life of it from five to seven days (April of 2014). The 
restrictive legislative regime of shelf life of pasteurized milk prior to April of 2014 led to the 
following consequences: a) higher prices of pasteurized milk than the EU average, b) the exclusion 
of raw milk imports in the Greek market, c) the limitation of competitive pressure at all stages of 
production, d) the limitation of direct imports of final products from retailers and importing 
companies from other countries, e) the distortion of product availability and consumer choice, 
especially for consumers in Greek islands and mountain villages and finally to the discouragement 
of new small farmers to supply new products in the market (OECD, 2014). 
However, Greek farmers (“producers”) do not share the above considerations. On the 
contrary, they tend to believe that deregulation of shelf life of pasteurized milk in 2014 and 2015 
have led to the reduction of wholesale prices, the reduction of quality of milk supplied to the final 
consumers and the increase of raw milk imports in the Greek market. Figure 1 shows that selling 
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prices of raw cow’s milk in five EU countries (Greece, Malta, Finland, Italy and Sweden) and EU 
average from 2005 to 2016. It is evident from Figure 1 that Greece continues to be among the 
countries with the highest wholesale prices in EU, but with a downward trend from 2013 onwards. 
Malta continues to exhibit the highest prices for almost the whole period, while in Finland, Italy, 
Sweden and EU average, the selling prices of raw cow’s milk indicate a sharp declining tendency 
the last two years (2015 – 2016). As it is evident, the effect of market deregulation and openness 
on the evolution of wholesale milk prices is an important exercise that need to be carefully 
executed.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
In this paper we use an unbalanced panel dataset of 4,230 monthly observations for 45 
Greek regions, spanning the period from January 2010 to October 2017, to determine the driving 
forces of wholesale price of milk in Greece. For this purposes we apply two dynamic GMM 
estimators (DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM), the panel DOLS methodology and we supplement our 
analysis with econometric methodologies which allow for heterogeneous slope coefficients across 
group members, nonstationarity and cross-section dependence (Mean Group estimator, Common 
Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator and the Augmented Mean Group estimator).  
This paper contributes the literature in many fronts. First and foremost, this is the first study 
to the best of our knowledge that tries to assess the impact of deregulation and market openness of 
the Greek milk industry on wholesale prices. In this way, we infer if changes in the relative 
competitiveness of milk producers are linked with certain deregulation policies gradually imposed 
by the Greek government on behalf of the OECD competition guidelines. Therefore, we put the 
OECD policy recommendations for the deregulation of the milk sector in Greece (i.e extension of 
the shelf life for fresh milk, lifting barriers to entry, etc) into empirical scrutiny by performing a 
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post evaluation analysis targeted at the wholesale milk prices. The later constitutes an additional 
novelty of this study, acting an important companion to policy makers and government officials in 
their effort to further enhance the level of competition in the specific sector. Lastly, from the 
econometric perspective, this study goes beyond the existing literature in that it uses a battery of 
dynamic panel data techniques (i.e GMM, DOLS and Mean Group estimators) in order to capture 
the dynamic interactions between the sample variables to further explore the validity of our 
findings. This kind of analysis is generally new in the empirical literature and may help 
practitioners and government officials in their attempts to understand the driving forces of milk 
sector. 
Our article is related to the literature that broadly studies the effect of market deregulation 
on the competitiveness of a certain industry (i.e milk sector).Even though the topic might be 
considered narrow, the literature on it is broad in its relevance, being pertinent to economic theory, 
dynamic competition, pricing, pass-through, collusion (Albæk et al, 1997), market power and the 
link between information and consumer demand, among others. One would expect that this volume 
of work would have led to some robust conclusions on the way that deregulation policies pursue 
industry competitiveness. Though a number of important contributions have been made (see 
among others Genakos et al, 2018; Hendel et al, 2017; Abito, et al, 2016; Carranza et al, 2015; 
Ofek, 2012; Kahal, 2011; Davis and Kilian, 2011) the basic question of how large and persistent 
are the deregulation measures, has drawn widely different answers. We try to shed some light on 
this debate.  
The results that emerge from the empirical analysis clearly show that abolishing regulation 
led to a significant increase in the level of wholesale prices. Moreover, we argue that the openness 
of the relevant milk market segment had significant implications to the level of competition in the 
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sector. It is noteworthy that our empirical findings remain rather robust under different empirical 
methodologies and sample splitting, providing a focal point to policy makers and government 
officials for the ex-post evaluation of the deregulation strategies 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the milk sector in 
Greece with all its regulatory interventions. Section 3, presents the data and the empirical 
framework used in the analysis, while Section 4 discusses the different econometric methodologies 
employed. Section 5 presents the results along with the necessary preliminary testing and the 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper, while offering some policy 
recommendations. 
2. The Greek milk sector  
Greek regulation regarding pasteurised milk took a conservative approach regarding its 
regulation and definition during the period from 1959 to 2014 (see Table 1). Specifically, Royal 
decree 4/1959 on Veterinary and hygiene check of milk determined that the shelf life of pasteurised 
(fresh) milk cannot exceed 2 days, while it identified two types of milk, fresh and pasteurised. 
Presidential decree 430/1981 extended the shelf life of pasteurised (fresh) milk to 3 days, while 
presidential decree 104/1988 determined that the shelf life of pasteurised (fresh) milk cannot 
exceed 4 days. Presidential Decree 113/1999 determined that the shelf life of pasteurised milk 
cannot exceed 5 days. It also identified two types of milk two types of pasteurisation procedures: 
the low temperature pasteurization (at least +71.7o C for 15 seconds), where the shelf life is 
defined at maximum five (5) days and the high temperature pasteurization (between 85o - 127o C), 
where the maximum shelf life is at the discretion of the manufacturer.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
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The first attempt of Greek legislator to deregulate the restrictive Greek regime for the shelf life of 
pasteurised milk was on 2014. Law N. 4254 of 4th April 2014 determined that the shelf life of 
pasteurised milk cannot exceed 7 days. As it concerns the types of milk the Law inserted one 
difference beside the Presidential Decree 113/1999: it explicitly defined the notion of pasteurised 
milk (at least +71.7o C for 15 seconds or at least +63o C for 30 minutes). Full deregulation of the 
restrictive Greek regime for the shelf life of pasteurised milk was adopted on 14 th of August 2015. 
Law N. 4336 determines that the shelf life of pasteurised milk and the maximum shelf life is at the 
discretion of the manufacturer.  
Relevant EU legislation takes a less conservative approach regarding the definition of 
pasteurised milk. According to it, the manufacturer of milk is the only responsible to guarantee the 
safety of its product and specify the date of minimum durability up to which pasteurised milk may 
be consumed (Regulation (EC) No 852/20042). Moreover, Regulation (EC) No 852/20043 defines 
two types of non-condensed milk: pasteurized milk, which is processed at low/high temperatures4 
and ultra high temperature (UHT) milk, which is processed at higher temperatures and needs not 
be refrigerated5. 
From the above it turns out that, on the retail level, four types of drinking milk may be 
found in the Greek market: a) pasteurised milk, b) high-pasteurised milk, c) UHT milk, and d) 
condensed milk. According to EU law, both the pasteurised and the high-pasteurised types of milk 
                                                          
2See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0001:0054:en:PDF.  
3See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0055:0205:en:PDF.  
4 “Pasteurisation is achieved by a treatment involving: i) a high temperature for a short time (at least 72°C for C for 15 
seconds); ii) a low temperature for a longtime (at least 63°C for C for 30 minutes);or iii) any other combination of time-temperatureconditions to obtain an equivalent effect.” 
5“Ultra high temperature (UHT) treatment is achieved by a treatment: i) involving a continuous flow of heat at a high 
temperature for a short time (not less than 135°C .........., and ii) sufficient to ensure that the products remain 
microbiologically stable after incubating for 15 days at 30°C in closed containers or for seven days at 55°C in closed 
containers or after any other method demonstrating that the appropriate heat treatment has been applied.” 
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would consist of a single category and any differences would be reflected only in the shelf life 
printed on the product packaging. 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of consumed milk quantity (log prices measured in tones) for 
the top four regions in Greece (Thessaloniki, Larissa, Xanthi, Serres). The top four regions possess 
the 55% of milk quantity demanded in Greece during the period from January 2010 to October 
2017. Figure 1 indicates that in Thessaloniki and Xanthi the demand for milk follows a negative 
path, while in Larissa and Serres the demand for milk follows a positive path. 
Around the partial deregulation of the restrictive Greek regime for the shelf life of 
pasteurized milk (April 2014) consumption of milk depicts a decline until September 2014 and an 
immediate increase onwards until May 2015. However, the decline of milk consumption begins 
prior to April 2014 (January 2014), following by a huge increase of consumption from almost May 
2013. This is more evident for regions 16 and 25 than in the other two regions of Figure 2. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 Around the full openness of the restrictive Greek regime for the shelf life of pasteurized 
milk (August 2015) consumption of milk depicts a decline until the end of the year 2015, following 
by a sharp increase onwards until March 2016. However, the decline of milk consumption begins 
prior to August 2015 (May 2015), following by a huge increase of consumption from almost 
September 2014. Overall, putting the two periods together (prior and after the deregulation), Figure 
1 depicts that consumed milk quantity prices follow a yearly cycle. 
Figure 3 plots the wholesale prices of pasteurized milk regarding the four most productive 
regions (big “four”) in Greece namely Thessaloniki, Larissa, Xanthi and Serres during the 
deregulated period (May 2014-. It is evident that after the full openness of the shelf life of the 
pasteurized milk on August 2015 the wholesale prices depicted an increase in all of the four 
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regions. Specifically, in Thessaloniki (region 16) the average wholesale price increase of milk is 
about 2.73% in January 2016, after an immediate average decrease of about -1.02% in September 
2015. In Larissa (region 25) the average wholesale price increase of milk is about 4.83% in January 
2016, after an immediate average decrease of about -1.39% in September 2015. The corresponding 
values for the other two regions (regions 31 and 38 accounting for Xanthi and Serres respectively) 
in January 2016 are about 1.91 and 1.40%, while in September 2015 the average wholesale price 
decreases of pasteurized milk are about -0.97 and -1.06 respectively. 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
During the period from the deregulation to the full openness of the shelf life of pasteurized 
milk (May 2014 – August 2015), its wholesale price exhibits a marginal decrease. For instance, in 
Thessaloniki (region 16), the average decrease is about -0.22% (the lowest value), while in Larissa 
(region 25), the average decrease is about -0.25% (the highest value). However, during the period 
from May 2014 until January 2015, that is, eight months after the deregulation on April 2014, in 
two regions, Thessaloniki and Larissa, the average wholesale price of pasteurized milk exhibits an 
increase of about 0.06% and 0.24% correspondingly.  
Lastly but not least, from January 2017 until October 2017 the average wholesale price of 
pasteurized milk exhibits an increase in the four regions. That is, in Xanthi the average wholesale 
price increase is about 0.62% (the highest value), while, in Serres, the corresponding increase is 
about o.33% (the lowest value). 
Figure 4 shows the histogram of the log wholesale milk constant prices (horizontal axis) 
over the entire period and regions under scrutiny scaled to density (vertical axis). It is evident from 
the following figure that the histogram is close to symmetric, which means that the mean and 
median are close to each other. That is, the data is fairly balanced on each side. 
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<Insert Figure 4 about here> 
3. Data and empirical modelling  
Our econometric analysis is based on an unbalanced panel dataset of 4,230 monthly 
observations, spanning the period from January 2010 to October 2017 (N = 45 and T =94).The 
selected sample includes 45 Greek regions, with five regions being omitted (Zakynthos, Kastoria, 
Kefallinia, Korinthia and Messenia). The starting date for the study was dictated strongly by data 
availability, while the final date observation (October 2017), represents the last month for which 
data mostly regarding the wholesale milk prices were available at the time the research was 
conducted.  
Specifically, the empirical analysis followed in this study employs real wholesale milk 
price as the dependent variable drawn from the Hellenic Agricultural Organization (HAO) 
“DIMITRA”.6 On the right hand side (RHS) of the equations used in our dynamic models we 
include several independent variables (covariates) to capture the main determinants of the 
wholesale milk price variations. Specifically, we used the consumed milk quantity per region 
measured in tones. Moreover, we include the level of nominal milk income expenditure of a 
specific region which is converted to its real income expenditure form, using the Harmonised 
Consumer Price Index (HCPI), given that consistent estimates of regional disposable per capita 
income are not available for the sample period under examination. While data on the level of 
quantity milk consumed per region and nominal income expenditure for each of the 45 regions are 
obtained from the HAO, HCPI data are obtained directly from Eurostat (Economy and finance 
                                                          
6For the years 2010-2015 all the data for prices and milk quantities are drawn from the Hellenic Milk and Meat 
Organization. 
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database). To the empirical ends of the analysis, we also include the total number of milk producers 
per regions a proxy for the level of market structure.  
The inclusion of two dummy (dichotomous) variables and their interactions with the RHS 
covariates supplements our empirical modelling. The first binomial variable takes the value one 
when the introduction of the seven day fresh milk was legally implemented (from May 2014 
onwards) and zero otherwise (up to April 2014). This variable measures the level of market 
deregulation on pasteurized milk. We also include a second dummy variable taking the value one 
when full market openness was introduced (from September 2015 onwards) and zero otherwise 
(up to August 2015). In addition, we focus on the 45 Greek regions, while we drop five regions 
from the empirical analysis since data for the milk quantity demanded were not available over the 
whole sample period or completely missing. 
Similarly to Katsoulacos et, al, (2014) we assume after imposing zero homogeneity, the 
basic following log-linear inverse demand function of the form:  
1 2 3p q pm f                         (1) 
where: log( )p P , log( )q Q , log
P
pm
M
 
  
 
, log( )f F , P is the price, Q is the quantity, 
M P Q  is income (total expenditure) and F is the number of producers in the 45 regions. Finally 
ε is a random shock with ( , , ) 0E q pm f  .  
The following table summarizes the main descriptive statistics. For the empirical exercise 
presented in the next section, all data (except for the dummy variables) are presented in a 
logarithmic form. From the careful inspection of Table 2, it is evident that the data are well 
behaved, showing limited variability in relation to the mean of the population since the coefficient 
of variation does not exceed 50% in all of the cases. In contrast, the variables as expected do not 
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follow the normal distribution, since the relative values of the skewness and kurtosis measures are 
not zero and three respectively. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
4.  Empirical methodology  
In this study, we apply panel methods which take into account both cross-section and time 
dimensions of the data. However, when the errors of a panel regression are cross-sectionally 
correlated then standard estimation methods can lead to inconsistent estimates and incorrect 
inference (Phillips and Sul, 2003; Apergis 2016).  
In order to take into account possible endogeneity issues (reverse causality) arising from 
the inclusion of income expenditure as an independent variable in tandem with other RHS 
variables such as the milk quantity demanded per region, we apply two dynamic GMM estimators 
(DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM) and the panel DOLS methodology fully developed by Kao and 
Chiang (2000). Lastly, we supplement our analysis with novel econometric methodologies which 
allow for heterogeneous slope coefficients across group members, nonstationarity and correlation 
across panel members (cross-section dependence) as in our case. Specifically, we implement three 
different estimators namely the Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group estimator (MG), the 
Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator (CCE) and the Augmented 
Mean Group estimator (AMG), introduced by Bond and Eberhardt (2009) and developed by 
Eberhardt and Teal (2010). 
4.1  Dynamic GMM estimators  
With the intention to examine the dynamic aspects we use dynamic panel data techniques 
such as Difference Generalised Method of Moments (DIF-GMM) estimators attributed to Arellano 
and Bond, (1991) and System Generalised Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) estimators proposed 
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by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) respectively. The use of the latter is 
mainly justified as it improves significantly the estimates’ accuracy and enlarges efficiency when 
the lagged dependent variables are considered as poor instruments as in the first-differenced 
regressors (Greene, 2003, Baltagi, 2002, Halkos and Polemis, 2017; Abid, 2017). As a 
consequence, the SYS-GMM gives more robust results than the first-differenced GLS and GMM 
estimation methods (Bond et al., 2001). 
In our case and in modelling dynamic effects we have the lagged dependent among the 
independent variables in the following form:  
, 1it it i t itY X Y u        i=1,2,…,N , t=1,2,…,T  (2) 
whereδbeing a scalar, 
itX  1xK and β Kx1 and uitfollow a one-way error component model 
(uit=μi+vit); with 
2(0, )i IID   and 
2(0, )it vv IID  are independent of each other and between 
them. As Yit is a function of μi then Yi,t-1 is also a function of μi and it is correlated with the error 
term. We have used panel data methods to estimate the above equation. Then the first difference 
GMM estimation is given as 
, 1
1 1
, 1 , 1
1 1
ˆ
N N
i t i N i i
i i
G N N
i t i N i i t
i i
y Z W Z y
y Z W Z y


 

 
 
   
    
   
   
    
   
 
 
        (3) 
With the choice of WN being important with the first-step consistent estimator of d being  
    
*
1
1
1
ˆ
N N
i i
i
W
Z
N



 
  
 

        (4) 
In (4) if Xit are predetermined with current and lagged Xits uncorrelated with current term 
then E(Xijuis)=0 for st. A combination of strictly exogenous and predetermined X variables may 
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more realistic compared to the two extreme cases with matrix Z i adjusted according to each case. 
Arelano and Bover (1995) integrated this approach with the instrumental variables of Hansen and 
Taylor (1981) with individual series being highly persistent and δbeing near to one. Estimation 
details, of the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM estimators are provided in the Appendix. 
Based on the above, the dynamic specifications of the models are given by the following 
reduced form equations:   
, 1 2 3
1 0 0 0
1 2 3 4
( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )
7 7 log( ) 7 log( ) 7 log( )
L M N R
it i t o l i it l it m it n it r
l m n r
it it it it
Log P n b d P b Q b M b Firms
c D c D Q c D M c D Firms u
    
   
       
      
   
(5) 
, 1 2 3
1 0 0 0
1 2 3 4
( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )
log( ) log( ) log( )
L M N R
it i t o l i it l it m it n it r
l m n r
it it it it
Log P n b d P b Q b M b Firms
c Dopen c Dopen Q c Dopen M c Dopen Firms u
    
   
       
      
   
(6) 
Wherei = 1,2,…45, t = 1,2,…94 and l is the time lag operator for the dependent variable.  
The interpretation of the variables comes as follows. P stands for the wholesale milk prices 
per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). Q is the milk quantity 
demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by the Harmonised 
Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number of milk 
producers per region. D7 is the dummy variable taking the value one when the introduction of the 
seven day fresh milk was legally implemented (May 2014) and zero otherwise. Dopen denotes the 
dummy variable taking the value one when full market openness was introduced (September 2015) 
and zero otherwise. The relevant equations (Eq. 5 and 6) include also the interactions (cross terms) 
of the two dummy variables (D7 and Dopen) with the rest covariates capturing the possibility of 
non-linear effects in the formulation of wholesale milk price.   
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Moreover, ni is the unit-specific residual that differs between regions but remains constant 
for any particular region (unobserved region level effect); while γt captures the time effect and 
therefore differs across years but is constant for all regions in a particular year. Moreover, we have 
also used sector fixed effects in our model. L, M, N and R are the lag operators determined by the 
minimisation of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Lastly, uit denotes the i.i.d error term.  
4.2  The dynamic OLS methodology  
Stock and Watson (1993) provide a parametric approach for estimating long-run equilibria 
in systems which may involve variables integrated of different orders but still cointegrated. The 
potential of simultaneity and small-sample bias among the regressors is dealt with by the inclusion 
of lagged and led values of the change in the regressors (Phillips and Loretan, 1991; Saikkonen, 
1991). More precisely, DynamicOLS methodology(DOLS) is employed to estimate the single 
cointegrating vector that characterizes the long-run relationship among the variables under 
scrutiny. It is simply a regression of one of the variables onto contemporaneous levels of other 
variables, a constant and leads and lags of their first differences using the methodology of Ordinary 
Least Squares. 
The empirical model to be estimated under the DOLS methodology is specified in the 
following way: 
Yit = β0 + β⃗
 Χ + ∑ d⃗ jXt−j + ut
p
j=q         (7) 
where Y is the dependent variable and X is a matrix of explanatory variables, β⃗  is the 
cointegrating vector and q and p are the leads and lags correspondingly. The cointegrating vector 
represent the long – run cumulative multipliers, that is, the long – run effect of a change in X’s on 
Y. Lead and lag terms included in Equation (7) have the purpose of making its stochastic error term 
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(ut) independent of all past innovations in stochastic regressors (i.i.d). Unit root tests are performed 
on the residuals of the estimated DOLS regression, in order to test whether its stochastic error is 
unit-root nonstationary (Choi et al, 2008). In this study, we apply the panel DOLS estimator 
developed by Kao and Chiang (2000) suitable for cointegrated panel data with homogeneous long-
run covariance structure across cross-sectional units.  
4.3  The mean group estimators  
Pesaran and Smith (1995) propose fitting separate regression for each country and calculate 
a simple arithmetic average of the coefficients. However, the Mean Group estimator (MG) does 
not concern with cross - section dependence. More precisely, Pesaran and Smith (1995) propose 
the estimation of equation (1) for each panel member (country) with the intercept to capture the 
fixed effects and a linear trend to capture time – variant unobservables. Finally, coefficients 𝑏𝑗 are 
averaged across countries. 
The Common Correlated Effects (CCE) methodology, recommended by Pesaran (2006) 
and Kapetanios et al. (2011), takes into account that the errors of a panel regression are cross-
sectionally correlated and heteroskedastic (cross-sectional dependence). 
Lastly, the Augmented Mean Group estimator (AMG) was developed in Bond and Eberhardt, 
(2009) and Eberhardt and Teal, (2010) as an alternative to Pesaran's CCE approach. The AMG 
approach is implemented in three levels: in the first level is performed the “common dynamic 
process” (an OLS estimation of augmented pooled regression model with the use of year dummies). 
In the second level the group specific regression model is augmented with the estimated 
coefficients of year dummies. Like the Pesaran and Smith (1995) methodology the regression 
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model includes an intercept, which captures time – invariant fixed effects. Lastly, in the third level 
the group specific model parameters are averaged across countries.7 
5.  Results and discussion  
In this section we present our empirical findings obtained by the implementation of standard 
dynamic panel methodologies (DIF and SYS-GMM, DOLS) as well as the two main mean group 
estimators (CCE and AMG) which serve as robustness checks to ensure the validity of the 
econometric results. Our empirical analysis also supplemented by some necessary preliminary 
tests accounting for the investigation of cross-section dependence and stationarity along with 
cointegration usually overlooked by similar studies.   
5.1.  Preliminary testing  
5.1.1  Cross-section dependence  
One of the additional complications that arise when dealing with panel data compared to 
the pure time-series case, is the possibility that the variables or the random disturbances are 
correlated across the panel dimension. The early literature on unit root and cointegration tests 
adopted the assumption of no cross-sectional dependence. However, it is common for micro-level 
data to violate this assumption which will result in low power and size distortions of tests that 
assume cross-section independence. For example, cross-section dependence in our data may arise 
due to common unobserved effects due to changes in milk legislation. Therefore, before 
proceeding to unit root and cointegration tests we test for cross-section dependence. We use the 
cross-section dependence test (CD test) developed by Pesaran (2004). As it is evident from Table 
3 the relevant tests strongly rejects the null hypothesis of cross-section independence. In face of 
                                                          
7Estimation details, of the three Mean Group Estimators are provided in the Appendix. 
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this evidence we proceed to test for unit roots using tests that are robust to cross-section 
dependence (i.e second generation tests for unit roots in panel data).  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
5.1.2  Unit root tests and cointegration 
To examine the stationarity properties of the variables in our models we use two second 
generation unit root tests namely the Fisher type Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test developed 
by Choi (2001) and Pesharan (ADF) both suitable for unbalanced panel data set and cross-section 
dependence. The former combines the p-values from N independent unit root tests, as developed 
by Maddala and Wu (1999). Based on the p-values of individual unit root tests, Fisher's test 
assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at 
least one series in the panel is stationary. Unlike the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test, Fisher's test does 
not require a balanced panel as in this case (Merryman, 2004). The second test runs the t-test for 
unit roots in heterogenous panels with cross-section dependence, proposed by Pesaran (2003). 
Parallel to Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test, it is based on the mean of individual DF (or ADF) t-
statistics of each unit in the panel. Null hypothesis assumes that all series are non-stationary. To 
eliminate the cross dependence, the standard DF (or ADF) regressions are augmented with the 
cross section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series (Lewandowski, 
2006). As it is evident from the inspection of Table 4, both tests support the presence of a unit root 
across all four variables under consideration. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
In order to investigate whether a long-run equilibrium relationship exists among the sample 
variables we implement Pedroni's (1999) ADF-based and PP-based cointegration tests as well as 
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Kao's (1999) ADF-based tests. All these tests allow for cross-section dependence and are suitable 
for an unbalanced panel data (Pedroni, 2000; 2001). This is the reason for not using the error-
correction-based panel cointegration tests proposed by Westerlund (2007) broadly applied in 
similar empirical studies. The latter also allow for cross-section dependence and represent an error-
correction approach to testing for cointegration that are based on the statistical significance of the 
error correction term. The intuition behind this approach is that if a long run relationship between 
the variables in our model, we can write a regression that allows us to estimate the error-correcting 
terms which reflect the response of the system to random shocks that “pushes” the system towards 
its long-run equilibrium point. If the error-correction terms are significantly different from zero 
across sections, then there is evidence in favor of the existence of a long-run relation.   
The results of the tests are presented in Table 5. All seven tests suggest the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of nocointegration null at any reasonable significance level.This means that 
cointegration statistics provide sufficient evidence to support the existence of a structural 
relationship between the wholesale milk price and of long run relations between the variables of 
the inverse demand function. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
5.2  Empirical findings  
In the previous section we found evidence in favor of cointegration. Hence, our next step 
is to estimate the long-run equilibrium relationships.Tables 6 and 7 present the empirical results 
from dynamic GMM and OLS methodologies (eq. 5-7)  
Table 6 presents the dynamic panel estimators of DIF/SYS GMM and OLS methodologies 
and of the whole sample under scrutiny. It is evident from Table 6 that the estimates are all highly 
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statistically significant and robust given that eq. (5), (6) and (7) represent structural and not 
spurious long-run relations.8In every econometric model employed we obtain plausible signs of 
the estimated coefficients. The estimations of coefficient 
0b  in eq.5 and 6 and the estimated 
coefficient of Xt−jin eq. 7 are always statistically significant and smaller than 1 for all the 
dependent variables employed within the 45 regions under scrutiny. For instance, the highest 
significant estimate is 0.632 under SYS-GMM methodology. We also estimate the dependent 
variable with two lags in the right hand side of eq. 5and with three lags in the right hand side of 
eq. 6 since it is found to be (highly) statistical significant in all the empirical models employed. 
This result strengthens the importance of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the right 
hand side of eq. 5, 6 and 7 (Fotis and Polemis 2018; Fotis et al. 2017). 
<Insert Table 6about here> 
In every econometric model employed we obtain plausible signs of the estimated 
coefficients. The demand for pasteurized milk in Greece is price inelastic since the estimated 
coefficients of electricity price has the appropriate sign and is below unity (Bouamra-Mechemache 
et al. 2008; Wilson and Thompson 1967). For instance, a 1% percent increase of quantity of milk 
supplied will cause a fall of wholesale price by almost 0,15% under SYS-GMM methodology and 
almost 0,5% under DOLS methodology. Therefore, the inversedemand function of pasteurized 
milkis more sensitive under the latter rather than under the former methodology, but in both cases 
is price inelastic.9 
                                                          
8We have also estimated the relevant models using time dummies to control for seasonal effects. The estimation results 
are qualitatively similar in all cases and are available upon request.  
9However, when we estimate the econometric model with SYS methodology, the estimated parameter of electricity is 
almost 1 indicating unit elasticity of demand. 
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The effect of total expenditure (M) is positive and highly statistical significant under all 
econometric methods employed. The highest effect of total expenditure on wholesale price of 
pasteurized milk is under SYS-GMM methodology where the estimated coefficient is marginal 
above one. The estimated coefficients of all other methodologies is below one, but always positive. 
The effect of the number of producers on wholesale price of milk is negative and highly statistical 
significant under SYS and DIF GMM econometric methods.10 This result indicates that the higher 
the number of milk suppliers the lower the wholesale price of pasteurized milk.  
When we introduce the effect of market deregulation on pasteurized milk (binomial 
variable D7) interesting results emerge. First and most interesting, the effect of deregulation on 
wholesale prices is positive and highly statistical significant except from the estimated coefficient 
of DOLS methodology, which is negative, but not statistical significant. This result coincides with 
the result we get from Figure 3 above, in which eight months after the deregulation the average 
wholesale price of pasteurized milk in Thessaloniki and Larissa exhibits an increase of about 
0.06% and 0.24% correspondingly. Besides, the demand for pasteurized milk in Greece continues 
to be price inelastic and the product under scrutiny is a normal good. The effect of the number of 
producers on wholesale price is positive and statistically significant, except from the empirical 
result under DOLS methodology, which is negative, but statistically insignificant. However, the 
positive effect of the number of producers on wholesale price of pasteurized milk from May 2014 
onwards, that is, after the deregulation of the pasteurized milk sector in Greece, is minor since the 
highly significant effect under DIF-GMM methodology is marginal above zero (0,0181).  
                                                          
10Under DOLS methodology the estimated coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant. 
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We get almost the same results when we introduce the effect of market openness on 
pasteurized milk ((binomial variable Dopen). Under all methods of estimation the effect of 
deregulation on wholesale prices is positive and highly statistical significant. Recall from the 
analysis of figure 3 above that from January 2017 until October 2017 the average wholesale price 
of pasteurized milk exhibits an increase in the top four regions (Thessaloniki, Larissa, Xanthi and 
Serres). The demand for pasteurized milk becomes more price inelastic and the effect of total 
expenditure on wholesale price of milk is less pronounced (the highly statistical significant 
estimation is 0,00813 under DOLS methodology) than before September 2015. Even though the 
effect of the number of producers on wholesale price is positive and statistically significant, it 
seems to be also less pronounced than before the full openness of the market of pasteurized milk 
since its highly statistical estimation under DOLS methodology is less (0,00277) than the 
equivalent estimation after the deregulation of the market on April 2014. 
In Table 7 we present the results from SYS-GMM estimators under sample splitting. As in 
Table 6 the estimations of coefficient 0b  in eq.5 and 6 and the estimated coefficient of Xt−j in eq. 
7 are always highly statistical significant and smaller than 1 for all the dependent variables 
employed within the 45 regions under scrutiny. This result strengthens the importance of the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of eq. 5, 6 and 7. The demand for 
pasteurized milk becomes less price inelastic from September 2015 onwards, but its absolute value 
continues to be below one. Moreover, the pasteurized milk is always a normal good, while the 
effect of the increase of the number of producers on wholesale price is negative, but statistically 
insignificant for both periods under scrutiny (from May 2014 and September 2015 onwards). The 
estimated coefficient of the latter effect is the same and statistically significant for the whole period 
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(Jan. 2010 – October 2017) and the period until the full openness of the milk sector in Greece (Jan. 
2010 – August 2015).  
<Insert Table 7about here> 
5.3  Robustness checks  
Using simple OLS to estimate the cointegrating relation will lead to bias in the estimated 
coefficients unless all of the explanatory variables are strongly exogenous. Moreover, its 
standardized distribution is dependent on nuisance parameters that are linked with the dynamics 
underlying the data generating processes of variables (Katsoulacos et al, 2014).Furthermore, other 
OLS estimators that remove the endogeneity bias such as the Fully-Modified OLS (Pedroni, 2000) 
or the Dynamic OLS (Kao and Chiang, 2000) are inadequate for our data since they assume cross-
section independence. As Pesaran and Smith (1995) point out, other traditional methods for 
estimating pooled models such as the Fixed Effects and the Instrumental Variables estimators 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) can produce very misleading estimates of the average 
values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope coefficients are in fact 
identical. Furthermore, the Arellano and Bond (1991) method performs well for 𝑁 > 𝑇 which is 
not the case in our sample. 
For the above reasons, we estimate an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model for 
panel data to examine the long-run equilibrium and the short run dynamics of our models, and 
specifically the Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group (MG) estimator. In order to account for the 
presence of nonstationarity and cross-section dependencewe employed two other mean group 
estimators such as the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) and Augmented Mean Group estimators 
(AMG). The benefits of using this approach is that the latter account strongly for the existence of 
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non-stationarity and cross-section dependence in the panel sample while eliminate the 
asymptotical bias in the estimators due to the endogeneity of the regressors (Pesaran, 2015).  
In Table 8 we present the results from Mean group estimation for market deregulation. As 
in Table 6 and 7 the estimations of coefficient 
0b  in eq.5 and 6 the estimated coefficient of Xt−j in 
eq. 7 are always highly statistical significant and smaller than 1 for all the dependent variables 
employed within the 45 regions under scrutiny. This result strengthens the importance of the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of eq. 5, 6 and 7. Under MG and 
CCE estimators market deregulation positively affects wholesale prices of pasteurized milk. The 
demand for pasteurized milk during the whole period under scrutiny is unit elastic and this result 
is the same with the one that emerges from the estimated coefficient under SYS – GMM 
methodology in Table 6. However, the deregulation of the market on April 2014 indicates that the 
market demand becomes price inelastic. Indeed, the absolute values of demand elasticity under all 
the empirical models employed are lower than the corresponding values derived from the dynamic 
estimations.   
<Insert Table 8about here> 
The effect of the number of producers on wholesale price is positive and statistically 
significant, except from the empirical result under MG-CCE methodology, which is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. However, the positive effect of the number of producers on wholesale 
price of pasteurized milk from May 2014 onwards, is minor since the highly significant effect is 
marginal above zero (0,016). We get the same results when we introduce the effect of market 
openness on pasteurized milk (binomial variable Dopen) in our analysis.11 
                                                          
11However, the majority of the empirical results from the introduction of binomial variable Dopen are statistical 
insignificant and therefore their presentation here is not useful for our analysis.  
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<Insert Table 9about here> 
6.  Conclusions and policy implications  
The scope of this paper is to investigate the impact of market deregulation on the 
competitiveness of raw milk producers in Greece along the suggested lines of OECD (OECD, 
2014). The study uses a dynamic panel data approach, to assess changes in the relative 
competitiveness of milk producers as a result of certain deregulation policies imposed by the Greek 
government in two phases (May 2014 and September 2015). For this purpose we use micro level 
data drawn from the 45 Greek regions spanning the period from January 2010 to October 2017. 
The empirical results of the study reveal that the effect of market deregulation on April 
2014 and its subsequent full openness on August 2015 positively affect the wholesale prices of 
pasteurized milk. The inverse demand function of pasteurized milk in Greece is price inelastic. 
Total expenditure positively affects the price of pasteurized milk, while the absolute value of its 
elasticity is below unity indicating that elasticity is income inelastic. Based on our empirical 
findings, it is argued that the higher the number of milk suppliers the lower the wholesale price of 
pasteurized milk. The demand for pasteurized milk during the deregulated period stated on April 
2014 continues to be price inelastic, while after the full openness of the market (May 2015) the 
demand seems to be more price inelastic than before. Besides, total expenditure for pasteurised 
milk in Greece becomes more inelastic after the abolishment of regulation. 
When we split the sample into different sub-samples (before and after the deregulation and 
the full openness of the market), the empirical results reveal that the demand for pasteurized milk 
becomes less price inelastic from September 2015 onwards, but its absolute value is estimated 
bellow unity. Moreover, demand continues to be income inelastic. The same result is confirmed 
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when we account for the presence of nonstationarity and cross-section dependence, while demand 
is more income elastic, but bellow unity. The majority of the empirical findings indicate that 
consumers, continue to buy pasteurized milk, even in the cases where price increases. This result 
reflects the importance of pasteurized milk in the daily consumption of Greek consumers and 
signify that suppliers of pasteurised milk continue to possess market power against their customers 
from downstream market (i.e. the market for packaging and distribution of pasteurised milk). 
Deregulation and full openness of the milk market firstly appeared in 2014 and 2015 
enhances the level of competition in the local market. Specifically, we claim that prices fell down 
since local suppliers (farmers) face competitive pressure from other sources of competition, such 
as imports from abroad. The abolition of restrictive shelf life of pasteurised milk offers the 
opportunity of foreign suppliers to compete Greek local farmers more easily and effective than 
before. Direct imports lower the cost of raw materials and therefore the transportation cost of the 
pasteurised milk supplied into the Greek market. Therefore, competition is further enhanced since 
retailers, after the deregulation and the full openness of the market, import cheaper pasteurised 
milk from abroad. This result lends support to the increase of the competition intensity among the 
market players (i.e suppliers), leading to lower prices for the consumers. The substitution of part 
of Greek pasteurised milk with imported milk from abroad, leads to cost reductions and finally to 
lower consumer prices. 
The overall effect on pasteurised milk prices is negative as a result of liberalisation. On the 
one hand there is a positive pressure on prices due to the fact that Greek suppliers continue to 
possess market power against their customers and their competitors from abroad. On the other 
hand, deregulation and full openness of the local market for pasteurised milk drive wholesale 
prices down in favour of final consumers. 
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Greek government must continue to provide incentives in order to attract more imports of 
milk from abroad. This policy needs to take into account the strategic development of Greek 
suppliers. Along these lines, policy makers and government officials should provide the local 
suppliers incentives to increase their productivity by investing in new technology and developing 
new business strategies. For example R&D investments will boost effectiveness among farmers 
and enable them to tackle efficiently the competition generated from abroad. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A  DYNAMIC GMM ESTIMATORS  
 
The GMM estimators rely on moments of the form: 
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where
i  is a iT xp  matrix of instruments for cross section i  and     ,i i itu Y f X   . 
Specifically, GMM minimizes the following quadratic form with respect to   
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whereW is a pxp weighting matrix.  
The coefficient covariance matrix is estimated as 
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Where Ξ is estimated as 
         i i i i i iE E u u                (A.4) 
And G  is a 
iT xk  matrix given as:  
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34 
 
The weighting of matrix W may be calculated using the White robust covariances the coefficient 
covariance estimates are given as 
1 1'*
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The first parenthesis is an adjustment to the degrees of freedom relying on the total number of 
observations; *M is the total number of stacked observations and 
*k the number of estimated 
parameters. The general form of the equation estimated with panel data dynamic models is one 
with individual effects like the following:   
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whereλt and ηi correspond to specific and individual effects, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, 
β(L) is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator and q is the maximum lag length. 
Identification of the model requires restrictions on the serial correlation of the error term vit and on 
the properties of the independent variables Xit allowing only for MA or white noise errors. If the 
error term was originally autoregressive, the model is transformed. The weighting of matrix W
may be calculated using the White robust covariance the coefficient covariance estimates are given 
as:  
1 1'*
* *
t tt t t t t t
t t t
M
X X X u u X X X
M k
 
      
              
        (A.8) 
The first parenthesis is an adjustment to the degrees of freedom relying on the total number of 
observations; *M is the total number of stacked observations and 
*k the number of estimated 
parameters. Orthogonal deviations as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1988) express each 
35 
 
observation as the deviation from the average of future observations in the sample and weight each 
deviation to standardize the variance: 
 x x x x T t T t T tit it i t iT* ( )( ... ) / ( ) ( ) /       1 1   t=1,…T-1     (A.9) 
The (Ti –q) equations for individual unit i can be written as: 
 Y w d vi i i i i                    (A.10) 
whereδ is a parameter vector including ακ's, β's and λ' s; andwi is a data matrix containing the time 
series of the lagged endogenous variables, the x' s, and the time dummies.  di is a (Ti-q) x1 vector 
of ones. Following Arellano and Bond (1998), linear GMM estimators of δ may be computed by 
the following expression:  
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  (A.11) 
wherewi
*  and Yi
*  denote some transformation of wi and Yi such as first differences, orthogonal 
deviations or levels. Zi is the matrix of instrumental variables and Hi is an individual specific 
weighting matrix. We may have one-step estimates, which use some known matrix as the choice 
for Hi. For a first - difference procedure, the one-step estimator uses Hi,while for orthogonal 
deviations or for a levels procedure the one-step estimator sets Hi to an identity matrix.  If the vit 
are heteroskedastic, a two-step estimator is used.   
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B. MEAN GROUP ESTIMATORS  
Consider the following multifactor residual model:  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡                (B.1) 
wherejt is the jth cross section observation at time t, for t = 1,2,.........T, j = 1,2, .....N. 
ejt = a1j + λj
′Φt + ujt                      (B.2) 
whereΦt is a mx1 vector of unobserved common factors and λj
′   a heterogeneous factor loading. 
Both Yjt and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 are observables and 𝑏𝑗are country-specific slopes on the observable regressors. 
𝑎1𝑗capture time-invariant heterogeneity across groups, i.e. countries, and 𝜆𝑗
′ 𝛷𝑡 capture time-
variant heterogeneity and cross - section dependence. 
𝑋𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎1𝑗 + 𝜆𝑗
′ 𝛷𝑡 + cj𝛤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡        (B.3) 
𝛷𝑡and𝛤𝑡 are mx1 vectors of unobserved common factors and 𝜆𝑗
′   and cj are heterogeneous factors 
loading Even though 𝛷𝑡 is present in equations (B.1) and (B.2), we assume that the regressors are 
not driven by the same common factors as the observables. 
Pesaran (2006) adopts the following multifactor residual model:  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗𝑋 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡         (B.4) 
where X is a matrix of explanatory variables, jt is the jth cross section observation at time t, for t = 
1,2,.........T, j = 1,2, .....N and 𝑒𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑗
′𝛷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡. 𝛷𝑡is a mx1 vector of unobserved common factors 
and 𝜆𝑗
′  a heterogeneous factor loading. 
Even though Pesaran (2006) considers the case of weakly stationary factors, Kapetanios et 
al. (2011) show that Pesaran's CCE approach continues to yield consistent estimation and valid 
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inference even when common factors are unit root processes. To deal with the residual cross section 
dependence Pesaran(2006) uses cross sectional averagesas observable proxies for 
commonfactors𝛷𝑡. The cross sectional averages are ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 and ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 .  
Given the previous means Equation (B.4) becomes: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗𝑋 + 𝑐?̅?𝑡 +  𝑑?̅?𝑡 +  𝑒𝑗𝑡        (B.5) 
Estimation of equation (B.5) with OLS provide, under strict exogeneity, the OLS estimators ?̂?𝑗 of 
the individual speciﬁc slope coeﬃcients (𝑏) as the CCE estimators. The Common Correlated 
Eﬀects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator is the average of the individual CCE estimators (?̂? =
∑ ?̂?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ) and follows asymptotically the standard normal distribution. Pesaran (2006) and 
Kapetanios et al. (2011) show that the CCE estimators have the correct size, and they 
haveshownthatsmall-sample properties of the CCE estimators do not seem to be much aﬀected by 
the residual serial correlation of the errors.The dynamic version of equation (B.5) is given as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑗𝑋 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑗
′𝛷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡       (B.6) 
Since the lagged dependent variable is not strictly exogenous the OLS estimator of the above 
equation becomes inconsistent. Chudik and Pesaran (2015) show that the OLS estimator gains 
consistency if√𝑇
3
 are added in equation (13). Therefore, the latter becomes: 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑗𝑋 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐽
′ 𝑧?̅?−𝐼
√𝑇
3
𝐽=0 +𝑒𝑗𝑡, 𝑒𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆𝑗
′𝛷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡    (B.7) 
where 𝑧?̅? = (?̅?𝑡 , ?̅?𝑡−1, ?̅?𝑡). The Mean Group Estimates are
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 , where ?̂?𝑗 = (𝛽𝑗, 𝑏𝑗). 
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Figure 1. Selling raw cow’s milkprices in selected EU countries (2005-2016)
 
 
Notes: The absolute prices give information on the levels of the producer prices of raw cow’s milk. 
Prices are net of VAT. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration (Data from Eurostat: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tag
00070 
 
  
Greece Malta Finland Italy Sweden EU Average
2005 35.28 35.74 34.51 36.18 30.50 28.24
2006 34.95 34.41 35.83 35.10 30.16 27.88
2007 38.67 37.51 37.91 36.41 32.87 31.98
2008 43.20 47.50 43.49 41.47 37.23 34.90
2009 37.69 44.86 38.94 37.07 28.16 27.16
2010 37.33 41.34 39.41 37.46 36.17 30.61
2011 43.16 47.18 42.63 43.38 39.65 34.36
2012 45.08 49.00 44.91 42.26 38.95 33.48
2013 44.42 52.19 45.90 43.19 42.42 36.93
2014 43.16 46.84 44.27 43.22 41.33 36.84
2015 41.84 46.66 37.58 38.23 33.50 31.05
2016 38.65 45.61 37.20 37.13 32.56 29.20
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Figure 2. Consumed milk quantity for the top four regions in Greece 
 
Notes: * in logs (measured in tones); Region 16: Thessaloniki, Region 25: Larissa, Region 31: Xanthi, Region 38: 
Serres 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Hellenic Agricultural Organization (HAO) “DIMITRA” 
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Figure 3. Prices of pasteurised milk for the big “four” regions in Greece 
 
Notes: Prices are in real terms and reported here in logarithmic scale. Region 16: Thessaloniki, Region 25: Larissa, 
Region 31: Xanthi, Region 38: Serres. The black vertical line indicates the extension of the shelf life of milk from 
five to seven days (May 2014), while the orange vertical line represents the full market openness (September 2015). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Hellenic Agricultural Organization (HAO) “DIMITRA” 
 
Figure 4. Histogram of wholesale milk prices  
 
Notes: P_Cons denotes the log wholesale milk constant prices. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Hellenic Agricultural Organization (HAO) “DIMITRA” 
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Table 1: Legislation of Pasteurized milk in Greece (1959–2015) 
Official Gazette Maximum shelf life of  
pasteurized milk 
Types of milk 
No. 89/16.5.1959*(Royal Decree4)       2 days [article 12(6)] Fresh and Pasteurised [article 2] 
No. 113/4.5.1981* (Presidential Decree430) 3 days [article 5(6)] - 
No. 46/16.3.1988* (Presidential Decree 104) 4 days [article 1] - 
Νο. 115/9.6.1999*(Presidential Decree 113) 5 days [article 1] Fresh/Pasteurised and High Pasteurised 
(HPM)** [article 1] 
Νο. 85/7.4.2014***     (Law N. 4254) 7 days [article 2(a)] Pasteurised**** and High Pasteurised 
(HPM)** [article 2(a)] 
Νο. 94/14.8.2015***** 
(Law N. 4336) 
at the discretion of the 
manufacturer 
Pasteurised and High Pasteurised 
(HPM)** [article 1] 
Notes:*On Veterinary and hygiene check of milk, ** HPM is a unique Greek term, not to be confused with Ultra High 
Temperature (UHT) pasteurised milk. The maximum shelf life is at the discretion of the manufacturer, ***Sub-paragraph 
F8: Removal of barriers to Competition in milk market – Regulation of Dairy products, ****The term fresh milk is not 
used any more on the packaging of the final product,*****Part B: Article 2, Sub-paragraph A3: Regulation of other issues 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
Variables Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum  
      
Log (P) 4,040 6.061 0.160 3.319 6.654 
Log (Q) 4,040 12.50 2.139 3.798 16.57 
Log (M) 4,040 11.65 2.122 3.304 15.77 
Log (Firms) 4,040 3.002 1.719 0.000 6.301 
D7 4,230 0.447 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Dopen 3,780 3.920 4.997 0.000 1.000 
D7 × log(Q) 4,230 0.277 0.447 0.000 1.000 
D7 × log (M) 4,040 5.303 6.305 0.000 16.55 
D7 × log (Firms) 4,040 4.939 5.887 0.000 15.70 
Dopen × log (Q) 4,040 3.121 5.492 0.000 16.48 
Dopen × log (M) 4,040 2.901 5.116 0.000 15.59 
Dopen × log (Firms) 4,040 0.726 1.506 0.000 5.930 
      
Notes: Authors’ estimations. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer 
Price Index (2015=100). Q is the milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region 
deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number of milk 
producers per region. D7 is the dummy variable taking the value one when the introduction of the seven day fresh 
milk was legally implemented and zero otherwise. Dopen denotes the dummy variable taking the value one when 
market openness was introduced and zero otherwise. Standard errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo 
with 500 repetitions.  
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Table 3:Cross-section dependence test  
Variable CD test P-value Correlation Absolute 
(correlation) 
Log (P) 241.57*** 0.000 0.570 0.571 
Log (Q) 414.20*** 0.000 0.977 0.977 
Log (M) 412.09*** 0.000 0.972 0.972 
Log (Firms) 417.86*** 0.000 0.986 0.986 
Notes: Under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence the CD statistic is distributed as a two-tailed standard 
normal. Results are based on the test of Pesaran (2004). The p-values are for a one-sided test based on the normal distribution. 
Correlation and Absolute (correlation) are the average (absolute) value of the off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional 
correlation matrix of residuals. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price 
Index (2015=100). Q is the milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by 
the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number of milk producers per 
region. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Significant at ***1% level of statistical significance.     
 
 
Table 4: Panel unit root tests 
Variable Fisher type ADF Pesaran ADF 
Log (P) 1,122*** -30.097*** 
Log (Q) 1,580*** -26.005*** 
Log (M) 1,626*** -25.213*** 
Log (Firms) 1,910*** -30.970*** 
Notes: The number of lags has been set to one according to BIC. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test is used 
rather than Phillips-Perron test (see Phillips and Perron, 1988). The null hypothesis assumes that the variable 
contains unit root. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price 
Index (2015=100). Q is the milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region 
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deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number 
of milk producers per region. Significant at ***1%.      
 
Table 5: Pedronipanel cointegration test results  
  Within Dimension Test Statistics Between Dimension Test Statistics 
Panel v-statistic 
8.203*** 
(0.000) 
Group ρ-statistic 
-53.8*** 
(0.000) 
Panel ρ-statistic 
-55.96*** 
(0.000) 
Group PP-statistic 
-69.43*** 
(0.000) 
Panel PP-statistic 
-63.44*** 
(0.000) 
Group ADF-statistic 
-66.72*** 
(0.000) 
Panel ADF-statistic 
-61.45*** 
(0.000) 
  
Notes: Of the seven tests, the panel v-statistic is a one-sided test where large positive values reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration, whereas large negative values for the remaining test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. The seven tests follow asymptotically a standard normal distribution. The first three non-parametric tests 
correct for serial correlation. These tests comprise of a non-parametric variance ratio statistic, a test analogous to the Phillips 
and Perron (PP) rho-statistic and, a test analogous to the PP t-statistic. These panel statistics are based on pooling the data 
along the within dimension of the panel. The fourth parametric test is similar to the ADF-type test. The other three panel 
cointegration statistics are based on a group mean approach. The first two of the group-mean panel cointegration statistics 
are panel versions of the Phillips and Perron rho and t-statistics, respectively. The third is a group-mean ADF test analogous 
to the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root test (Katsoulacos, et al, 2014). The critical values were created using 
a bootstrapping method. Significant at ***1% and **5% respectively.     
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Table 6: Dynamic panel estimators under different methodologies  
Control variables (1) 
SYS-GMM 
(2) 
SYS-GMM 
(3) 
DIF-GMM 
(4) 
DIF-GMM 
(5) 
DOLS 
(6) 
DOLS  
LogP(-1) 0.606*** 
(0.0982) 
0.632*** 
(0.0930) 
0.0233*** 
(0.00491) 
0.0128*** 
(0.00431) 
1.304*** 
(0.000802) 
1.155*** 
(0.000815) 
LogP(-2) 0.257*** 
(0.0889) 
0.269*** 
(0.0906) 
-0.0768*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0707*** 
(0.0132) 
-1.192*** 
(0.000828) 
-1.081*** 
(0.000853) 
LogP(-3) - - 0.0398*** 
(0.00702) 
0.0395*** 
(0.00686) 
0.393*** 
(0.000679) 
0.382*** 
(0.000699) 
Log (Q) -0.0847** 
(0.0383) 
-0.154** 
(0.0753) 
-1.017*** 
(0.00700) 
-1.026*** 
(0.00799) 
-0.497*** 
(0.000812) 
-0.545*** 
(0.000758) 
Log(M) 0.191*** 
(0.0518) 
0.240*** 
(0.0815) 
1.024*** 
(0.00645) 
1.028*** 
(0.00751) 
0.497*** 
(0.000761) 
0.545*** 
(0.000691) 
Log(Firms) -0.113** 
(0.0574) 
-0.0916** 
(0.0426) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.00373) 
-0.0137*** 
(0.00293) 
9.75e-05 
(0.000451) 
6.78e-05 
(0.000450) 
D7 1.787** 
(0.751) 
- 0.126*** 
(0.0262) 
- -0.00303 
(0.00274) 
- 
D7 × log(Q) -0.617*** 
(0.143) 
- -0.0367** 
(0.0156) 
- 0.00200* 
(0.00104) 
- 
D7 × log (M) 0.459*** 
(0.0881) 
- 0.0240 
(0.0154) 
- -0.00191* 
(0.000999) 
- 
D7 × log (Firms) 0.198* 
(0.105) 
- 0.0181*** 
(0.00403) 
- -1.45e-05 
(0.000302) 
- 
Dopen - 1.356** 
(0.594) 
- 0.0293 
(0.0220) 
- 0.0101*** 
(0.00286) 
Dopen × log (Q) - -0.315** 
(0.142) 
- 0.0117 
(0.0123) 
- -0.00887*** 
(0.00208) 
Dopen × log (M) - 0.173 
(0.157) 
- -0.0182 
(0.0120) 
- 0.00813*** 
(0.00211) 
Dopen × log (Firms) - 0.194* 
(0.106) 
- 0.00819* 
(0.00424) 
- 0.00277*** 
(0.000325) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 3,935 3,935 3,790 3,790 2,698 2,546 
Regions  45 45 45 45 45 45  
Fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes No No 
45 
 
Wald/F test 1.33e+06*** 
[0.000] 
1.21e+06*** 
[0.000] 
25,118.35*** 
[0.000] 
30,667.88*** 
[0.000] 
7.77e+06*** 
[0.000] 
6.64e+06*** 
[0.000] 
AR(1) -1.61* 
[0.108] 
-1.49 
[0.137] 
-5.27*** 
[0.000] 
-5.33*** 
[0.000] 
- - 
AR(2) -0.27 
[0.784] 
-0.28 
[0.782] 
-4.46*** 
[0.000] 
-5.47*** 
[0.000] 
- - 
Hansen test 44.97 
[1.000] 
44.89 
[1.000] 
44.98 
[1.000] 
44.99 
[1.000] 
- - 
Notes:The number of lags has been determined according to BIC. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised 
Consumer Price Index (2015=100). Q is the milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by the 
Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number of milk producers per region. D7 is the dummy 
variable taking the value one when the introduction of the seven day fresh milk was legally implemented and zero otherwise. Dopen denotes the 
dummy variable taking the value one when market openness was introduced and zero otherwise. SYS-GMM is the system GMM estimator and DIF-
GMM denotes the difference GMM estimator. DOLS denote the dynamic OLS estimators. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers 
in square brackets denote the p-values. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order serial autocorrelation. F and Wald tests denote the joint 
statistical significance of all the covariates. Hansen denotes the test of over identifying restrictions of the instruments. Significant at ***1%, **5% and 
*10% respectively.  
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Table 7: System GMM estimators under sample splitting  
Control variables (1) 
[Jan 2010-Oct 2017] 
(2) 
[Jan 2010 – Apr 2014] 
(3) 
[May 2014-Oct 2017] 
(4) 
[Jan 2010 – Aug 2015] 
(5) 
[Sep 2015-Oct 2017] 
LogP(-1) 0.655*** 
(0.0939) 
0.538*** 
(0.0279) 
0.554*** 
(0.0770) 
0.638*** 
(0.0944) 
0.748*** 
(0.162) 
LogP(-2) 0.275*** 
(0.0913) 
0.338*** 
(0.0949) 
0.405*** 
(0.0183) 
0.277*** 
(0.0939) 
0.283* 
(0.154) 
Log(Q) -0.175** 
(0.0785) 
-0.120*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.461*** 
(0.0304) 
-0.163** 
(0.0731) 
-0.554*** 
(0.102) 
Log(M) 0.239*** 
(0.0868) 
0.215*** 
(0.0553) 
0.529*** 
(0.0420) 
0.236*** 
(0.0792) 
0.580*** 
(0.0921) 
Log(Firms) -0.0592* 
(0.0311) 
-0.0908 
(0.0568) 
-0.0533 
(0.0457) 
-0.0689** 
(0.0349) 
-0.00365 
(0.0303) 
Diagnostics  
Observations 3,935 2,307 1,648 3,012 923 
Regions  45 45 45 45 45 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Wald/F test 295,028.82*** 
[0.000] 
225826.48*** 
[0.000] 
284,506.78*** 
[0.000] 
231,312.94*** 
[0.000] 
441,989.55*** 
[0.000]   
AR(1) -1.48 
[0.140] 
-1.50 
[0.134] 
-1.03 
[0.303] 
-1.45 
[0.148] 
-0.99 
[0.322] 
AR(2) -0.28 
[0.777] 
-0.68 
[0.499] 
-1.38 
[0.167] 
-0.26 
[0.798] 
-1.17 
[0.242] 
Hansen test 44.96 
[1.000] 
44.90 
[1.000] 
44.94 
[1.000] 
44.97 
[1.000] 
43.99 
[0.233] 
Notes:The number of lags has been determined according to BIC. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index 
(2015=100). Q is the milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The 
variable Firms stands for the total number of milk producers per region. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets denote the p-values. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are tests for first and second order serial autocorrelation. F and Wald tests denote the joint statistical significance of all the covariates. Hansen denotes the test of 
over identifying restrictions of the instruments. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
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Table 8: Mean group estimation resultsfor market deregulation 
Control variables (1) 
MG 
(2) 
MG-T  
(3) 
MG-ORM  
(4) 
MG-CCE 
(5) 
MG-AUG 
(6) 
MG-AUGT 
(7) 
MG-AUGCDP 
Constant 7.111*** 
(0.0679) 
7.155*** 
(0.0787) 
7.116*** 
(0.0767) 
4.35e-05*** 
(7.91e-06) 
6.907*** 
(0.000744) 
6.907*** 
(0.00147) 
6.906*** 
(0.00146) 
Trend - -2.19e-05 
(3.30e-05) 
-5.99e-06 
(3.31e-05) 
- - 1.05e-05*** 
(1.48e-06) 
1.05e-05*** 
(1.48e-06) 
Log P(-1) -0.0157** 
(0.00688) 
-0.0163** 
(0.00708) 
-0.0157** 
(0.00665) 
6.94e-07 
(5.40e-07) 
-9.01e-05** 
(3.91e-05) 
-0.000181** 
(9.15e-05) 
-0.000180** 
(8.99e-05) 
Log P(-2) -0.0456*** 
(0.00991) 
-0.0461*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0106) 
6.67e-07 
(6.45e-07) 
1.88e-05 
(4.42e-05) 
-0.000147* 
(8.55e-05) 
-0.000140* 
(7.99e-05) 
Log P(-3) 0.0244*** 
(0.00681) 
0.0237*** 
(0.00673) 
0.0224*** 
(0.00722) 
-6.47e-07* 
(4.09e-07) 
- -0.000129 
(8.06e-05) 
-0.000133 
(8.10e-05) 
Log (Q) -1.031*** 
(0.0101) 
-1.030*** 
(0.0109) 
-1.025*** 
(0.0109) 
-1.000*** 
(4.23e-06) 
-1.000*** 
(9.76e-05) 
-1.000*** 
(0.000404) 
-1.000*** 
(0.000407) 
Log (M) 1.040*** 
(0.0104) 
1.039*** 
(0.0111) 
1.031*** 
(0.0110) 
1.000*** 
(4.22e-06) 
1.000*** 
(9.97e-05) 
1.000*** 
(0.000398) 
1.000*** 
(0.000401) 
Log (Firms) -0.0146*** 
(0.00422) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.00682) 
-0.0170*** 
(0.00491) 
-3.04e-07 
(2.87e-07) 
0.000570 
(0.000578) 
0.00128* 
(0.000772) 
0.00128* 
(0.000775) 
D7 0.0124*** 
(0.00367) 
0.00794* 
(0.00454) 
0.0525* 
(0.0294) 
1.04e-05** 
(4.16e-06) 
0.0125*** 
(0.00124) 
-0.000194 
(0.00253) 
-0.000232 
(0.00253) 
D7 × log(Q) -0.0211*** 
(0.00663) 
-0.0227** 
(0.00964) 
-0.0135* 
(0.00842) 
1.02e-06 
(9.26e-07) 
0.00264*** 
(0.000501) 
0.00522*** 
(0.000958) 
0.00522*** 
(0.000961) 
D7 × log (M) 0.0158** 
(0.00657) 
0.0173* 
(0.00953) 
0.00897 
(0.00810) 
-1.24e-06 
(9.53e-07) 
-0.00257*** 
(0.000499) 
-0.00511*** 
(0.000969) 
-0.00512*** 
(0.000973) 
D7 × log (Firms) 0.0160*** 
(0.00531) 
0.0160*** 
(0.00618) 
0.0165*** 
(0.00522) 
3.02e-07 
(4.81e-07) 
-0.000915* 
(0.000595) 
-0.00183** 
(0.000864) 
-0.00183** 
(0.000867) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,935 3,884 3,884 
Wald test 233,535.67*** 
[0.000] 
96,832.87*** 
[0.000] 
17,731.91*** 
[0.000] 
7.27e+10*** 
[0.000] 
1.33e+08*** 
[0.000] 
9.68e+06*** 
[0.000] 
9.15e+06*** 
[0.000] 
RMSE 0.0115 0.0114 0.0114 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes:The number of lags has been determined according to BIC. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). Q is the 
milk quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total 
number of milk producers per region. D7 is the dummy variable taking the value one when the introduction of the seven day fresh milk was legally implemented and zero otherwise. MG, MG-
T, and MG-ORM stand for standard Mean Group (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), Group Mean with a linear trend and GroupMeanwith outlier robust means.MG, MG-T and MG-ORM assume 
cross section independence. MG-CCE refers to the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation and inference method (Pesaran, 2006) and allows for cross sectional dependence.MG-
AUG, MG-AUGT and MG-AUGCDP denote the Augmented Mean Group estimator (Eberhardt and Teal, 2010; Bond and Eberhardt, 2009), Augmented Mean Group with a linear trend and 
Augmented Mean Group characterised by a common dynamic process with a unit coefficient. RMSE stands for the Root Mean Squared Error. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
numbers in square brackets denote the p-values. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.   
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Table 9: Mean group estimation results for market openness 
Control variables (1) 
MG 
(2) 
MG-T  
(3) 
MG-ORM  
(4) 
MG-CCE 
(5) 
MG-AUG 
(6) 
MG-AUGT 
(7) 
MG-AUGCDP 
Constant 7.115*** 
(0.0612) 
7.146*** 
(0.0691) 
7.096*** 
(0.0695) 
2.42e-05*** 
(6.58e-06) 
6.900*** 
(0.00318) 
6.907*** 
(0.000250) 
6.907*** 
(0.000250) 
Trend - 6.91e-05*** 
(1.99e-05) 
8.36e-05*** 
(1.77e-05) 
- - 7.12e-07*** 
(1.65e-07) 
7.16e-07*** 
(1.65e-07) 
Log P(-1) -0.0161** 
(0.00650) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.00678) 
-0.0169** 
(0.00657) 
9.23e-07* 
(5.28e-07) 
0.00111** 
(0.000443) 
5.49e-06 
(1.29e-05) 
4.87e-06 
(1.30e-05) 
Log P(-2) -0.0433*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0440*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0386*** 
(0.0111) 
-5.74e-07 
(4.60e-07) 
- -2.42e-05* 
(1.58e-05) 
-2.81e-05* 
(1.63e-05) 
Log P(-3) 0.0251*** 
(0.00701) 
0.0223*** 
(0.00659) 
0.0217*** 
(0.00710) 
- - - - 
Log (Q) -1.033*** 
(0.00921) 
-1.034*** 
(0.00978) 
-1.023*** 
(0.00946) 
-1.000*** 
(3.76e-06) 
-0.999*** 
(0.000419) 
-1.000*** 
(5.03e-05) 
-1.000*** 
(5.47e-05) 
Log (M) 1.039*** 
(0.00965) 
1.041*** 
(0.0100) 
1.025*** 
(0.00973) 
1.000*** 
(3.76e-06) 
0.999*** 
(0.000416) 
1.000*** 
(4.97e-05) 
1.000*** 
(5.41e-05) 
Log (Firms) -0.0111*** 
(0.00326) 
-0.0115** 
(0.00482) 
-0.00823** 
(0.00330) 
-1.23e-07 
(1.58e-07) 
1.40e-05 
(5.18e-05) 
8.88e-05*** 
(3.34e-05) 
8.82e-05*** 
(3.34e-05) 
Dopen -0.00705 
(0.0505) 
0.00532*** 
(0.0510) 
0.0335*** 
(0.00338) 
5.59e-06** 
(2.91e-06) 
0.0415** 
(0.0206) 
0.0125*** 
(0.000875) 
0.0126*** 
(0.000876) 
Dopen × log(Q) 0.0428*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0361*** 
(0.0119) 
0.0359*** 
(0.0116) 
-5.02e-06*** 
(1.80e-06) 
0.0199** 
(0.00931) 
0.00106** 
(0.000464) 
0.00107** 
(0.000464) 
Dopen × log (M) -0.0484*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0425*** 
(0.0122) 
-0.0412*** 
(0.0112) 
4.61e-06** 
(1.93e-06) 
-0.0173* 
(0.00908) 
-0.000965** 
(0.000463) 
-0.000968** 
(0.000463) 
Dopen × log (Firms) 0.00647 
(0.00664) 
0.00575 
(0.00677) 
0.000156 
(0.00538) 
4.30e-07 
(6.37e-07) 
-0.00137 
(0.00314) 
-0.000198 
(0.000146) 
-0.000196 
(0.000146) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,935 3,987 3,935 3,935 
Wald/F test 222965.67*** 
[0.000] 
2177,49.18*** 
[0.000] 
22,846.54*** 
[0.000] 
8.37e+10*** 
[0.000] 
4.95e+08*** 
[0.000] 
4.80e+08*** 
[0.000] 
4.10e+08*** 
[0.000] 
RMSE 0.0114 0.0114 0.0114 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:The number of lags has been determined according to BIC. P stands for the wholesale milk prices per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). Q is the milk 
quantity demanded per region in tones. M is the income expenditure per region deflated by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (2015=100). The variable Firms stands for the total number of 
milk producers per region. Dopen denotes the dummy variable taking the value one when market openness was introduced and zero otherwise. MG, MG-T, and MG-ORM stand for standard 
Mean Group (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), Group Mean with a linear trend and Group Mean with outlier robust means. MG, MG-T and MG-ORM assume cross section independence. MG-CCE 
refers to the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation and inference method (Pesaran, 2006) and allows for cross sectional dependence. MG-AUG, MG-AUGT and MG-AUGCDP 
denote the Augmented Mean Group estimator (Eberhardt and Teal, 2010; Bond and Eberhardt, 2009), Augmented Mean Group with a linear trend and Augmented Mean Group characterised by 
a common dynamic process with a unit coefficient. RMSE stands for the Root Mean Squared Error. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets denote the p-values. 
Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.   
